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Merger Activity in the Factors of Production Segments of the Food 
Value Chain: - A Critical Assessment of the Bayer/Monsanto merger 
 
 
Ioannis Lianos with Dmitry Katalevsky
*
 
 
Executive summary 
 
The Bayer/Monsanto merger forms part of the recent wave of mega-mergers that has 
transformed the structure of the factors of production segments of the global food value chain in 
recent decades. If it is approved, it will lead to the creation of a tight oligopoly of three 
multinationals that will control almost 2/3 of the global production in seeds and agro-chems, as 
well as the valuable Big Data and IT platforms that are crucial for “smart farming”. This high 
level of concentration will undoubtedly lead to price rises for seeds and pesticides, the increase 
of the technological and economic dependence of farmers on a few global integrated one-stop 
shop platforms, the reduction of independent centres of innovation activity in the industry and 
consequently of  innovation, due to reduced competition.  
More importantly, this merger is about control of the global food value chains as well as of 
the direction of the innovative effort in this industry in the next few decades. Recent 
technological advances enable us to envision a future away from the agro-chem model of 
agricultural production, with the adoption of a production model that is respectful of the 
environment and biodiversity, and also providing smallholders more opportunities to increase 
their revenue and the independence to invest in innovative ways of farming. By ensuring that the 
global food value chain remains tightly controlled by three mega-corporations (and their 
integrated platforms), the recent merger wave in this industry will lead to entrench the market 
power of the dominant players for the decades to come and to freeze the innovative effort to 
R&D that is compatible with the business model of the incumbents.  
EU competition law should intervene to make sure this does not happen. EU merger control 
should focus on the effects of the merger on innovation and the likelihood of constrained choice 
for farmers, which will be locked in integrated one-stop shop platforms. The absence of 
interoperability between the products of each platform, the farmers being offered packaged 
farming solutions, from IT and agricultural machinery to seeds and pesticides, and the 
foreclosure of existing and potential competition, may affect the development and diffusion of 
new technologies and of innovative ways of farming. The likelihood of collusion may also 
increase in view of the control of the tight oligopoly that will result from this merger by a limited 
number of institutional investors and the cross-ownership of competing agro-chem platforms.  
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More importantly, the recent mega-merger wave raises the question of the future control of 
global agricultural production, in view of the important progress of synthetic biology and the 
possibility of editing/constructing DNA. One of the most valuable productive asset in 
agricultural production will not anymore be the control of genetic material (e.g. seeds) but the 
control of genetic information (e.g. DNA sequences), the next generation biotech leading to 
revolutionary changes in bioengineering tools, enabling the systematic design of phenotypes by 
manipulation of genotypes. The economic actor that will control this strategically essential 
abstract information, for instance through Intellectual Property (IP) Rights, will finish by 
controlling physical living DNA designs. This may engender profound structural changes in the 
industry and will entrench the bargaining differential between farmers and the global oligopoly 
of agricultural and biotech firms, thus concentrating the control of global food production in a 
limited number of global corporations. This increased concentration of control may also lead to 
important risks for food security and safety, biodiversity, in addition to the more traditional 
parameters of consumer welfare (affordable food prices, high quality, variety and innovation). 
The mega merger wave to which the Monsanto/Bayer merger transaction significantly 
contributes to, would therefore, most likely, reduce the welfare of farmers, final consumers and 
the general public. 
 
I. Introduction: Mega-mergers in the factors of production segment of the global 
food value chain 
 
The Bayer/Monsanto merger forms part of the most recent mega-merger wave in the 
agricultural industry, after two large merger waves have transformed what was a competitive 
market in the early 1980s to a largely concentrated one today. The most recent merger wave was 
initiated in July 2014 when Monsanto made a number of acquisition offers to Syngenta.  These 
offers were rejected. However, the Monsanto bid triggered a number of other M&A transactions 
in this sector that were announced in 2015 and 2016. In November 2015, Syngenta accepted the 
offer of ChemChina (which owns ADAMA, one of the largest agrochemical companies in the 
world). The merger was cleared with conditions by the European Commission in April 2017 
(involving the divestiture of a significant part of ADAMA's existing pesticide business, plant 
growth regulator business for cereals, and all relevant intangible assets underpinning these 
businesses, including relevant personnel)
1
. In December 2015, Dupont and Dow announced their 
merger, which was cleared with conditions by the European Commission in March 2017
2
. In 
September 2016, Bayer put forward a merger deal with Monsanto, which is explored in detail in 
this paper. In September 2016, a deal was announced between two of the leaders in the market 
for synthetic fertilizers, Potash Corp and Agrium for US$30 billion. The deal is expected to close 
in mid-2017 and will create the largest fertiliser company in the world, which also plans to 
expand into seeds and crop chemicals. In November 2015, Deere & Co. (the leader in 
agricultural machinery) announced an agreement with Monsanto to buy its precision farming 
business, The Climate Corporation. This deal was, however, opposed by the US Department of 
Justice as it would have led Deere to control a significant part of the already highly concentrated 
                                                          
1
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2
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US high-speed precision planting systems market and it was eventually abandoned by the 
parties
3
. 
The projected mergers in the seed and agro-chem industry will greatly affect the future 
control of food production and innovation, which is essential in order to improve yields and feed 
the world. The European Commission, as many other competition authorities, is currently 
assessing how these mergers could lead to a significant impediment of effective competition 
(SIEC) by employing a narrowly designed substantive test that merely focuses on the effects of a 
merger on prices, output and innovation
4
. One may, however, ask if such important decisions for 
the control of food production should be based on such a narrowly confined test, or that one 
should consider more broadly the full social costs of such transactions to the extent that these 
may be assessed and eventually quantified. We therefore consider that in implementing 
competition law, the Commission has to take into account the broader impact of these mergers 
on environmental protection, as it is obliged to do by virtue of Article 11 TFEU
5
, and the 
international obligations on biodiversity to which EU Member States and the EU should abide 
to
6
. 
To the extent that the Commission would choose to limit its analysis on the narrow 
competition issues, we consider that there are a number of arguments in favour of blocking the 
merger or, alternatively, imposing strict conditions for its approval. We will explore these in the 
following Sections. 
 
II. The Bayer/Monsanto merger 
 
The merger brings together two giants of the seeds and agro-chem industry and will 
create the global leader in Agriculture Industry
7
. 
                                                          
3
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4
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6
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7
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Germany-headquartered Bayer AG is a “life science” company with core competences in 
the areas of health care and agriculture. Bayer has proceeded to a number of mergers and 
acquisitions in recent years (see Annex 1). Although Bayer’s strength is in agrochemicals, it is 
present in seeds as well, in particular since its acquisition of Aventis and its AgrEvo subsidiary 
in 2002. Bayer is present in rice, cotton, oilseed rape / canola, and vegetable seeds, but also, at 
least before the merger transaction, it aimed to gain competitive positions in wheat and soybeans. 
Bayer controls popular seed brands, such as Arize for rice, Credenz for soybeans, Fibermax for 
cotton, InVigor for canola seeds, Nunhems for vegetable seeds, Stoneville for cotton seeds, seed 
treatment solutions, such as Gaucho, glyfosinate-ammomium based herbicides like Liberty and 
Basta, and fungicides, like Nativo. Since its acquisition of US organic pest control company 
AgraQuest in August 2012, Bayer Crop Science has heavily invested in establishing a Biologics 
(crop protection) platform. Bayer is also present in “digital farming”, projecting to at least invest 
€200m in this area between 2015 and 2020, and currently selling and testing products in ten 
countries
8
. 
US-based Monsanto is an agrochemical and agricultural biotechnology corporation. Its 
Seed and Genomic segment produces germplasm, in particular row crop seeds (hybrid varieties 
and foundation seed) of corn, soybean, cotton, canola and other row crop seeds, as well as 
vegetable seeds, in particular open field and protected-culture seed for tomato, pepper, melon, 
cucumber, squash, beans, broccoli, onions and lettuce. Monsanto is a leader in germplasm 
positions in corn, soybeans, cotton and vegetables
9
. Furthermore, it disposes of a unique and 
patented seed chipping technology, which enables it to test improved seeds at the lab before the 
seed is even planted, thus reducing the time it takes to produce a new variety by more than two 
years
10
. Monsanto controls leading brands, such as Dekalb and Channel for corn, Asgrow for 
soybeans, Deltapine for cotton, Seminis and De Ruiter for vegetable seeds. Monsanto also 
develops biotechnology traits enabling crops to protect themselves from borers and rootworm 
and therefore assisting farmers in controlling insects and weeds. These products are distributed in 
various brands, such as SmartStax, YieldGard, YieldGard VT triple, VT triple PRO for corn, 
Intacta RR2 PRO for soybeans, Bollgard and Bollgard II for cotton. Its biotechnology traits 
enable crops, such as corn, soybeans, cotton and canola to be tolerant of Roundup branded and 
other glyphosate-based herbicides or dicamba herbicides and include brands such as Roundup 
Ready, RoundupReady 2 Yield, Roundup Ready 2 Xtend and Intacta RR2 PRO  (for soybeans), 
and Genuity. It disposes of advanced technologies for better control of weeds, insects and viruses 
with its RNA (genetic)
11
 spray technology (BioDirect Technology), without any “tinkering” with 
                                                          
8
 Bayer, Bayer’s commitment to innovation and sustainability will help shape the future of farming (Sept. 7 2016), 
available at http://www.press.bayer.com/baynews/baynews.nsf/id/Bayers-commitment-to-innovation-and-
sustainability-will-help-shape-the-future-of-farming . 
9
 Monsanto is n
o
 1 in the US and Brazil with at least a 50% market share, n
o 
1 in Argentina with 60% and n
o
 2 in the 
EU with 20% market share for corn with its DeKalb brand. Monsanto also controls a 40% market share in the US 
for soybean through its Asgrow brand, 40% in the US for cotton germplasm through its  brand Deltapine and is the 
global market leader with a 20% market share in vegetable seeds with its brands DeRuiter and Seminis : Monsanto, 
Accelerating the Future of Agriculture, Monsanto’s 8thWhistle Stop Investor Field Tour (August 17-18, 2016) 16-
20, available at https://monsanto.com/app/uploads/2017/05/whistle_stop_viii_day-1-session_materials.pdf  
10
 C. Patterson, Monsanto's Seed Chipping Technology, AgAdvance (January 2013), available at 
http://www.agadvance.com/issues/jan-2013/monsantos-seed-chipping-technology.aspx . 
11
 RNA interference (or RNAi) is a biological process where ribonucleic acid molecules inhibit gene expression or 
translation enabling the transfer of information from a gene to produce a protein. 
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the plants’ genes being necessary, for instance with the use of a transgenic approach that would 
create a plant to deliver the RNA, and just with a topical application of the RNA
12
. Monsanto 
licences genetic material to other seed companies for their seed and forms the central node of a 
spider web of cross-licensing agreements between the ‘Big Six’.  
Monsanto has considerably expanded its activity through a number of M&As the last two 
decades (see Annex 2). More recently, Monsanto acquired The Climate Corporation, which may 
omen a possible future integration strategy towards precision agricultural machinery equipment. 
“Precision farming” makes use of sensors to collect information from soil (various parameters 
such as the level of moisture, fertilizers and pesticides, soil organic matter, various soil 
properties such as bulk density, texture, compaction, etc.), and satellite images about crop growth 
progress. It then combines all information using big data algorithms to analyse it, in order to plan 
and adjust in real-time the need for inputs (e.g. pesticides). It is promised that this may improve 
the crop yield, but it may also have the effect to lock in farmers in the Monsanto value chain, 
making them technologically dependent as Monsanto owns or controls the data generated.  
The recent acquisition of the Climate Corporation by Monsanto is a bet to diversify beyond 
the traditional seeds and pesticides business model. The software developed by the Climate 
Corporation is aimed to become a powerful decision-support system and a crop progress 
monitoring tool for a typical farmer
13
. The idea is also to use the power of analytics (Big Data) 
and advanced marker technology to accelerate yield gains and digitize field testing
14
. The 
combination of big data metagenomics, bio-informatics, machine learning, and predictive 
analytics may lead to the development of next-generation insect-control solutions by re-targeting 
proteins
15
. Combined with the existing product portfolio of Monsanto (seeds, traditional and bio-
pesticides, etc.), the data analysis and recommendation tool of the Climate Corporation will 
enable Monsanto to build an integrated ‘beyond the seeds’ platform to farmers, enabling it to 
exploit new sources of revenue relating to equipment, fertilizer, pesticides, and even software, 
providing “optimized seeding and fertility” insights to farmers through Climate FieldView and 
other products
16
. Monsanto intends to sell subscription to the software as a stand-alone service 
on a global scale. The other “big six” of the seeds industry – Syngenta, DuPont Pioneer, Bayer, 
BASF, and Dow – are rapidly catching up by developing their own IT-platforms17.  
 
Take-away 
                                                          
12
 A. Regalado, The Next Great GMO Debate (August, 11, 2015), MIT Technology Review, available at 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/540136/the-next-great-gmo-debate/ . 
13
 D. Friedberg, The Climate Corporation Platform Update (21 August 2014), available at 
http://www.monsanto.com/investors/documents/whistle%20stop%20tour%20vii%20aug%202014/the_climate_corp
oration_update.pdf. (accessed May 29, 2017). 
14
 W. Vogt, Soybean Breeding Takes on Big Data (November 16, 2016), available at 
http://www.farmindustrynews.com/soybeans/soybean-breeding-takes-big-data ; Monsanto, Accelerating the Future 
of Agriculture, Monsanto’s 8thWhistle Stop Investor Field Tour (August 17-18, 2016) 59, available at 
https://monsanto.com/app/uploads/2017/05/whistle_stop_viii_day-1-session_materials.pdf  
15
 Monsanto, Press Release (Sept. 6, 2016), available at http://news.monsanto.com/press-
release/corporate/monsanto-collaborates-second-genome-use-microbiome-technology-platform-accel . 
16
 Boston Consulting Group, Crop Farming 2030 (2015) p. 12; J. Jansen, Unlocking Digital Ag and Seed 
Technology 6, available at http://files.constantcontact.com/fe439c1b001/3be810cd-551f-4ca4-8e4d-
f812e2aef91a.pdf?ver=1474384793000  
17
 ETC Group, Breaking Bad: Big Ag Mega-Mergers in Play, (December 2015), Communique 115.  
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The merger brings together two global giants in the seeds and agro-chem markets, following an 
extensive merger wave that further consolidates the factors of production segment of the global 
food value chain. The two companies produce an array of popular products and brands in seeds, 
seed treatment and pesticides and have been recently expanding to the lucrative data-driven 
“smart agriculture” market, constituting their own IT platforms, the  merged entity also 
positioning itself as the global leader in the metagenomics era. 
 
III. A horizontal, vertical and conglomerate merger 
 
The Bayer/Monsanto merger involves horizontal, vertical and conglomerate integration
18
, 
as the two companies focus their activities on different segments of the food value chain. Bayer 
is primarily present in pesticides, while Monsanto on trait/agro-biotech research, plant breeding 
and seed multiplication.  
There are, however, important horizontal overlaps between Bayer and Monsanto, 
raising important risks for actual and potential competition.  
Firstly, both companies compete in the seeds sector for various crops, in view of Bayer’s 
presence in the seeds segment, since its acquisition of Aventis in 2002. For instance, the two 
companies compete “head-to-head” in seed and traits for cottonseed and soybeans19. 
Secondly, there are considerable overlaps in the pesticides segment of the value chain. 
Monsanto manufactures the glyphosate-based Roundup Ready brand herbicides and other 
herbicides, such as the Harness® brand for cotton and corn. Bayer produces Liberty, a 
glyfosinate-ammonium based pesticide that not only directly competes with Roundup, but also 
constitutes the main challenger in this market, in view of the recent concerns raised by the World 
Health Organization’s International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), that re-classified 
glyphosate as “probably carcinogenic to humans” and the difficulties to extend the authorisation 
of glyphosate in the EU
20
. These overlaps may give rise to an important degree of horizontal 
consolidation, when two companies compete in the same relevant geographic markets.  
Thirdly, although pesticides and seed treatment may be considered as complements to 
seeds and traits, and hence forming separate product markets, the development of genetically 
modified (GM) seeds with traits will lead to some form of substitution between GM seeds and 
pesticides. For example, this substitution effect becomes clear if one takes into account that Bt-
corn varieties are registered as pesticides with the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA)
21
. The development of GM plant varieties resistant to certain diseases may also lead to a 
substitution effect between GM-plants and certain herbicides that aim to control weeds that are 
                                                          
18
 A merger is considered as “horizontal” if  it involves rivals selling substitutes products, “vertical” if it concerns 
firms along the supply-chain (eg, input supplier with product manufacturer, and upstream producer with downstream 
distributor), and “conglomerate” if it involves firms that are involved in totally unrelated business activities. 
19
 AAI, Food & Water Watch, National Farmers Union, Proposed Merger of Monsanto and Bayer, (2017, July 26
th
), 
6 & 12, available at https://nfu.org/2017/07/26/aai-fww-and-nfu-say-monsanto-bayer-merger-puts-competition-farmers-and-consumers-at-risk/ 
20
 For a summary see European Parliament, Renewing authorisation for glyphosate, (April 7, 2016), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/580894/EPRS_ATA%282016%29580894_EN.pdf 
(accessed May 29, 2017). 
21
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2017). 
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usually harbouring diseases. To this extent, the merger could be considered as limiting a source 
of actual and potential competition for pesticide firms.  
Fourthly, the two companies may have or develop overlaps in “digital farming”, both 
disposing of leading innovation capabilities and R&D technology platforms
22
. Monsanto is quite 
active in tools for precision planting and high-tech weather prediction through its subsidiary 
Climate Corporation
23
, while Bayer’s “digital farming” unit is active in soil analytics and 
decision support tools for farmers, such as weather analytics, crop yield models, pest and disease 
models, product data (mode of action, genetics)
24
. The situation in this emerging but crucial, 
from a strategic perspective, market is even more complex in view of the links between the 
merging entities and their competitors in this segment of the agricultural value chain, following 
the global licensing agreement in October 2016 between Monsanto and Dow AgroSciences on 
the Exzact Precision Technology Genome-Editing Platform for research and commercial 
development of new crop solutions across Monsanto Company’s research portfolio25. 
The non-horizontal dimension of the merger refers to the fact that the merging entity 
may have the ability and the incentive to foreclose competitors in upstream or downstream 
situated markets in the seeds, as well as in the crop protection value chain, and to produce 
exclusionary “portfolio effects”  arising from the combination of the complementary businesses 
of Monsanto and Bayer in traits, seeds, pesticides, herbicides, and digital farming to the 
detriment of final consumers, in this case farmers.  
The Commission is much less stringent on vertical integration than on horizontal 
overlaps as it believes more in the improvement of efficiencies and innovation through vertical 
integration. However, vertical integration may be problematic for competition, if it enables the 
new entity to strategically foreclose competitors
26
, by offering packaged solutions in the seed and 
traits value chain (Annex 3) and in the agrochemical supply chain (Annex 4), therefore 
increasing prices and/or reducing consumer choice. Looking, more specifically, to the seed and 
traits value chain, to the extent that there is an upstream market for the development and 
commercialisation of traits and a downstream market for the breeding of traited seeds, and that 
the treatment of seeds can be considered as an upstream market to the downstream supply of 
seeds, the merging entity may have the incentive to engage in a foreclosure strategy against 
rivals downstream and/or upstream. As each trait offers “unique characteristics to the particular 
seeds”, it cannot be excluded that “each company would have a monopoly on the trait 
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 AAI, Food & Water Watch, National Farmers Union, Proposed Merger of Monsanto and Bayer, (2017, July 26
th
), 
6; Bayer, Investor Handout (Septemebr 14, 2016), 14. 
23
 Fortune, Monsanto’s Climate Corp to Expand Digital Farming Platform (August 17, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/08/17/monsantos-climate-corp-to-expand-digital-farming-platform/ ; M. Stern, Digital 
Agriculture, (Speech, 2015), available at https://monsanto.com/app/uploads/2017/05/digital-ag-stern_2015.11.17.pdf 
. Monsanto has a significant presence in digital farming in Europe with the acquisition in November 2016 of 
Vitafields, a European farm management software company based in Tallinn, Estonia and present in seven European 
countries: Monsanto, The Climate Corporation Acquires VitalFields to Expand Digital Agriculture Innovation for 
European Farmer (November 21, 2016), available at http://news.monsanto.com/press-release/climate/climate-
corporation-acquires-vitalfields-expand-digital-agriculture-innovation  
24
 For more information, see http://www.digitalfarming.bayer.com/ . 
25
 Dow AgroSciences Press Release, Monsanto and Dow AgroSciences Announce Global Licensing Agreement on 
Exzact Precision Technology Genome-Editing Platform (October 3, 2016), available at 
https://www.dowagro.com/en-us/newsroom/pressreleases/2016/10/monsanto-dow-agrosciences-global-licensing-
agreement-exzact#.WY2qwoVOKUk . 
26
 M. Whinston, Lectures on Antitrust Economics (MIT, 2007). 
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developed”, in particular as this is also protected by patents and that other companies can only 
obtain access to it through licensing agreements
27
. Monsanto has a strong position in traits and, 
as highlighted above, forms the central node of the network of licensing agreements between the 
Big Six. The new entity will therefore have the ability to foreclose rivals from access to the traits 
licensed, and its incentive to foreclose will depend on a comparison of the revenues derived from 
foreclosure strategies with the foregone revenues derived from licensing to its downstream 
competitors. 
It is also possible to conceive the two value chains as forming in reality one: a 
technological platform/system consisting of, for instance, a non-selective herbicide tolerant 
traited seed and a corresponding non-selective herbicide, which are used in combination in order 
to provide farmers the best protection against weeds. When farmers make decisions on which 
seeds to plant they make their choice on the basis of the various systems available for the 
specific crop, after which they are locked in the specific “technological pathway” provided by 
this system
28
. For instance, a Liberty herbicide is formulated to work in conjunction with the 
Liberty Link traits, which is the glufosinate ammonium tolerate trait. Hence, seed companies and 
crop protection firms will not be able to compete with the merging entity’s platform “unless they 
are vertically integrated seed and crop protection firms who develop traits, breed seeds and 
develop active ingredients for herbicides” and they develop “their own traits for non-selective 
herbicide tolerance or license traits from the merging parties”29. 
The merger finally includes a conglomerate dimension, in view of Monsanto’s and 
Bayer’s presence in the seeds, crop protection and digital agriculture/smart farming value chains. 
In particular developing a new value chain, possibly integrating the three value chains on the 
basis of Big Data appears one of the main reasons motivating the merger transaction. It is clear 
that the acquisition of the Climate Corporation’s data science engine and extensive field research 
networks was Bayer’s principal drive to the merger30. The aim is to transform its core business 
from producing seeds, herbicides/pesticides and other products to providing an inclusive package 
of services to farmers, guiding their choice in the “40 interlocked decisions that inexorably a 
grower is going to make every single year”31, this of course to the greater benefit of the merging 
entity’s management and its shareholders. 
Big data also transforms crop genomics with new ways to measure, map, and share 
information for the development of new seed traits and new plant breeding methods. It becomes 
easier and cheaper to test varieties of genetics, crop inputs, and conditions across various 
different fields, soils, and climates. Farmers are also empowered by Big Data algorithms 
“creating visibility of pricing and performance of brand-name inputs”, which enable them to 
combine a variety of inputs and to select outside packaged or recommended offers
32
. By 
                                                          
27
 Competition Commission of South Africa, Case 2017Feb004 (Bayer/Monsanto) (May 3, 2017), p. 117, para. 364. 
28
 Competition Commission of South Africa, Case 2017Feb004 (Bayer/Monsanto) (May 3, 2017), p. 105, para. 317 
29
 Ibid., p. 106, para. 320. 
30
 On the importance of Big Data for “smart farming” and agricultural production, see S. Wolfert, L. Ge, C. 
Verdouw, M.-J. Bogaardt, Big Data in Smart Farming: A Review, (2017) 153 Agricultural Systems 69. 
31
 A. Murray, Why Bayer Wants Monsanto, Fortune (May 19
th, 2016) quoting an interview with Monsanto’s CEO 
Hugh Grant. 
32
 See, How Big Data is Disrupting Agriculture from Biological Discovery to Farming Practices, AgFunder news 
(June 9, 2016), available at https://agfundernews.com/how-big-data-is-disrupting-agriculture-from-biological-
discovery-to-farming-practices5973.html  
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integrating into digital farming, the big agrochemical companies would thus enhance their ability 
to maintain a tight control over their value chains, while one could imagine that they may also 
have the incentive to avoid disruptive innovation that could challenge their position in the seed 
and crop protection value chains. 
In the context of the development of new General Purpose Technologies (GPT), that may 
also present significant technology opportunities, such as CRISPR, conglomerate mergers may 
lead to significant barriers for new entrants in the various segments of the value chain, be that 
seeds, pesticides and/or (selective) herbicides, or precision farming. CRISPR-Cas9 and other 
genome editing technologies, such as the “more precise” CRISPR-Cpf1, allow scientists to 
manipulate the genetic makeup of an organism by de-activating or knocking out a gene function, 
eventually without the need to introduce genes from other organisms, as this is the case for 
classical GMO genetic engineering. These genome editing technologies may be used 
commercially for improvements in yield and pest resistance and other causes of crop loss, which 
may eventually reduce pesticide use, increased drought tolerance, and increased nutritional 
benefit. To the difference of conventional breeding techniques, genome editing makes it possible 
to reduce the time needed to generate the desired genetic characteristics in a plant population 
from 7-25 years to as few as 2-3 years as well as to bypass “the need to go through a number of 
plant generations to achieve a particular genetic combination”33. Another advantage of using 
CRISPR editing techniques is the recent USDA regulation suggesting that CRISPR modified 
seeds may not need regulatory approval as GMOs since in some cases gene manipulations may 
involve only deletions or modifications with existing DNA
34
. The competitive advantage of such 
genome editing technologies, should these not be subject to the existing restrictions of 
conventional GMO regulation, in comparison to conventional breeding methods, may 
significantly alter the market structure and industry dynamics.  
The technology’s unique advantage is that it allows multiple editing simultaneously in 
various parts of DNA able to inactivate up to tens of targets at once
35
. Therefore, CRISPR 
enables much faster products development. Monsanto has been researching for many years in 
genome editing technologies and has recently concluded licensing agreements for CRISPR-Cas 9 
from the Broad Institute for use in seed development
36
 as well as CRISPR-Cpf1, also from the 
                                                          
33
 See, Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genome Editing: An Ethical Review (September 2016), 56-62. 
34
 See, for instance, the recent controversy over the anti-browning mushroom developed by plant pathologist Yinong 
Yang at Pennsylvania State University using CRISPR-Cas9, which was not considered by the USDA as integrating 
any introduced genetic material and thus not regulated as a GMO (see 
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/downloads/reg_loi/15-321-01_air_response_signed.pdf ). Of course, the 
way GMOs are defined for regulatory purposes is different in Europe: see European Parliament, Briefing, New 
plant-breeding techniques (May 2016), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/582018/EPRS_BRI(2016)582018_EN.pdf  and the 
expected intervention of the Court of Justice of the EU in pending Case  C-528/16 (judgment expected in 2018). 
35
 L. Yang et al. Genome-wide inactivation of porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs) //Science. – 2015. – Т. 350. 
– №. 6264. – С. 1101-1104. 
36
 S. Begley, Monsanto licenses CRISPR technology to modify crops — with key restrictions (September 22, 2016), 
available at https://www.statnews.com/2016/09/22/monsanto-licenses-crispr/ . Since 2013, the Broad Institute has 
been issuing licenses for commercial research using CRISPR-Cas9. The licensing agreement with Monsanto 
included restrictions on the use of the technology, Monsanto not being able to use the technology for “gene drive”, 
thus spreading a trait through an entire population, or to create sterile (“terminator”) seeds. 
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Broad Institute
37
, in order to apply this technology across multiple crops. Monsanto’s (and 
Bayer’s) leading germplasm and genome libraries, as well as their strong position in traits, may 
provide the merged entity with a significant competitive advantage in the application of genome 
editing and Big Data technologies, thus entrenching their leading position in agricultural 
biotechnology for the years to come and affecting the incentives of would be entrants in the 
industry
38
.  
Combined with an opportunity to bypass a typically complex, lengthy and costly 
regulatory process of GMO approval as well as Monsanto’s and Bayer’s proprietary germplasm 
databases, the ability of merging companies to deliver new products to the market is expected to 
increase significantly. This conclusion complies with the finding of a recent study published by 
the US National Academy of Sciences that with the CRISPR breakthrough “the scope, scale, 
complexity, and tempo of biotechnology products are increasing”39. Combined with their digital 
platform solutions this will further add to the market power of both companies. 
Control of genome editing technologies by biotech incumbents, such as Monsanto and 
Bayer, may also limit the disruptive potential of these technologies (drastic innovation) with 
regard to GM biotech (recombinant DNA) or conventional breeding tools. Indeed, the merged 
entity may not have less incentive to develop new genome editing technologies when these could 
reduce pesticide use, therefore challenging their dominant position in agro-chem market
40
. The 
development of genome editing technologies for plants and animals may engender profound 
structural changes in the industry, as these technologies are cheaper. This may provide more 
opportunities for new entry in the seed and traits value chain. Indeed, as a recent Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics report observes, “the potential of genome editing techniques (in terms of 
decreased cost and technical difficulty, and increased speed) may revive the opportunities for 
small and medium-sized biotech companies in the agricultural area and unlock development of a 
wider variety of traits”41. This likely emergence of a more competitive market structure, in view 
of reduced endogenous sunk costs, may be blocked by the business strategies of integrated agro-
chem corporations that may try to establish one-shop platforms, combining traits, seeds, 
pesticides and smart agriculture or digital solutions for farmers in order to raise barriers to the 
independent entry of small and medium-sized start-ups in the various segments of the value 
chain. 
New entrants would need to enter simultaneously in various segments of the value chain, 
which may block the most usual way disruptive innovation occurs in technology-driven 
                                                          
37
 Monsanto Press Release, Monsanto Announces Global Genome-Editing Licensing Agreement With Broad 
Institute For Newly-Characterized CRISPR System (January 4, 2017), available at http://news.monsanto.com/press-
release/corporate/monsanto-announces-global-genome-editing-licensing-agreement-broad-institute . 
38
 AAI, Food & Water Watch, National Farmers Union, Proposed Merger of Monsanto and Bayer, (2017, July 26
th
), 
6; Bayer, Investor Handout (September 14, 2016), 6, note that “(t)he proposed merger of Monsanto and Bayer would 
combine the third and fourth largest firms, moving the merged firm to the top with $26,9 billion in combined 
revenue – 40% of combined industry revenue”. 
39
 National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Preparing for Future Products of Biotechnology. 
Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24605. 2017, p. 53 
40
 T. Greenaway, Monsanto’s Driverless Car: Is CRISPR Gene Editing Driving Seed  Consolidation? (April 
10, 2017), available at http://civileats.com/2017/04/10/monsantos-driverless-car-is-crispr-gene-editing-
driving-seed-consolidation/ reporting to the view expressed by Tom Adams, biotechnology lead for Monsanto, 
regarding gene-editing technology that “(w)e do not view it as a replacement for plant biotechnology”. 
41
 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genome Editing: An Ethical Review (September 2016), p.  62. 
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industries, that is, indirect entry outside the ‘core’ market cluster controlled by the incumbent 
firm
42
. Excluding these start-ups may raise the profitability of the merged companies, and their 
attractiveness to financial markets, but this is to the detriment of farmers and smaller mono-
product rivals, which are obliged to either licence their technology to the merged entity or merge 
with the agro-chem behemoths. This has of course the effect of creating a “growth bottleneck” as 
incumbents finish by controlling the direction of technological change
43
. 
 
Take-away 
 
The merger combines horizontal, vertical and conglomerate dimensions, and affects both actual 
and potential competition. This is a result of the ambition of the companies to constitute one-stop 
shop platforms for farmers, thus expanding the farmers’ economic and technological dependence 
vis-á-vis global seed and agro-chem platforms for most of the inputs necessary for agricultural 
production. 
 
IV. The consolidation of the factors of production segment 
 
The first step in the Commission’s assessment of the merger will be to explore the structure of 
the affected markets.  
 
A. Concentration in the world and EU markets for seeds 
 
The various segments of the factors of production markets have been progressively 
consolidated in (most frequently tight) oligopolies of six major players. The level of 
concentration varies according to the geographical market and the type of crop, but a constant is 
that markets in which penetration by genetically modified (GM) seeds is significant tend to be 
more concentrated than markets where the commercial use of genetically modified seeds is 
restricted. This becomes clear if one compares the level of concentration in the US, a GM seed 
market, to the European Union and China, which are largely conventional seed markets, although 
certain conventional crops may appear as concentrated
44
. 
The global consolidation of the crop seeds & biotechnology, agricultural chemical, 
animal health and breeding industries, as well as agricultural machinery has been duly noted by 
economic research
45
. High concentration in the food industry is not unusual. Fuglie et al. have 
                                                          
42
 T. Bresnahan & Y. Pai-Ling, Reallocating innovative resources around growth bottlenecks, SIEPR Discussion 
paper No. 09-022. 
43
 Ibid., 8. 
44
 See, I. Mammana, Concentration of Market Power in the EU Seed Market, (January 2014), Study commissioned 
by the Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament; ETC Group, Who will control the Green Economy? 
(November 2011), 11, available at 
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/pdf_file/ETC_wwctge_4web_Dec2011.pdf 
(accessed May 29, 2017), noting that the conventional breeding sector in Europe is not only the world’s biggest 
exporter, but is also highly concentrated. In particular, it concludes that the top 5 companies in the EU vegetable 
markets control 95% of the market. 
45
 N. E. Hart, The Age of Contract Agriculture: Consequences of concentration in Input Supply, (2000) 18(1) 
Journal of Agribusiness 115-127; J. King, Concentration and Technology in Agricultural Input Industries, USDA, 
Agriculture Information Bulletin no. 763.; J. MacDonald et al., Contracts, Markets, and Prices: Organizing the 
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demonstrated that five-six leaders in such industries as agricultural chemicals, farm machinery 
and animal breeding have more than 50% of the global market sales
46
. The latest estimates 
suggest that ‘the Big Six’ (Monsanto, Syngenta, DuPont, BASF, Bayer, Dow) collectively 
control more than 75% of the global agrochemical market, 63% of the commercial seed market, 
and almost three quarters of R&D expenses in the seeds and pesticides sector (as the combined 
R&D budget of the Big Six was fifteen times more important than the USDA crop science 
research budget in 2013)
47
. The same is true for the farm equipment sector where the top three 
companies (Deere & Co, CNH, AGCO) control 49% of the market (2013)
48
. If the 
Bayer/Monsanto merger is approved, three companies (ChemChina-Syngenta, Du Pont-Dow and 
Bayer-Monsanto) will own and sell about 60 percent of the world’s patented seeds and 64% of 
world’s pesticides/herbicides, as even if some of their assets are divested there are few 
established economic actors that would be able to purchase them and develop an independent 
and sustainable competitive offer in the industry
49
. 
This broad picture of concentrated market structures at a global scale may, however, hide 
a more complex competitive landscape in Europe. If one looks to the overall situation in Europe, 
with regard to the sale of seeds, the market appears at first to be less concentrated (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Net sales of the world top 10 seed companies in Europe (percentage of net sales)
50 
 
 
Company 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Du Pont/Pioneer 13.4% 15% 16.5% 16.1% 14.3% 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Production and Use of Agricultural Commodities, (2004) Agricultural Economic Report No. 837, 9; J. Fernandez-
Cornejo, The Seed Industry in U.S. Agriculture, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., Agric. Info. Bull. No. 786 
(2004), 4; N. Louwaars et al., Breeding Business: The future of plant breeding in the light of developments in patent 
rights and plant breeder’s rights, Centre for Genetic Resources, Report 14 (2009); K. Fuglie et al, Research 
Investments and Market Structure in the Food Processing, Agricultural Input, and Biofuel Industries Worldwide, 
USDA-ERS Economic Research Report No. 130 (2011); D. L. Moss, Competition, Intellectual Property Rights, and 
Transgenic Seed, (2013) 58 South Dakota Law Review 543-559; I. Mammana, Concentration of Market Power in 
the EU Seed Market, (January 2014), Study commissioned by the Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament; 
ETC Group, Who will control the Green Economy? (November 2011), available at 
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/pdf_file/ETC_wwctge_4web_Dec2011.pdf 
(accessed May 29, 2017); European Commission, Overview of the Agricultural Sectors in the EU Study (2015); M. 
M. Nesheim, M. Oria and P. Tsai Yin (eds.), A Framework for Assessing Effects of the Food System, National 
Academy of Sciences (2015), p. 54; Ph. H. Howard, Visualizing consolidation in the global seed industry: 1996-
2008, (2009) Sustainability 1(4):1266-1287; Ph. Howard, Concentration and Power in the Food System 
(Bloomsbury, 2016). 
 ETC Group, Outsmarting Nature, November 2015;  
 Boston Consulting Group, Crop Farming 2030 – The Reinvention of the Sector (April 2015), available at 
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/process-industries-innovation-crop-farming-2030-reinvention-
sector/ (accessed May 29, 2017) 
46
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10(4) Amber Waves 1-6, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2012-december/rising-concentration-in-
agricultural-input-industries-influences-new-technologies.aspx#.VpYe1-9unct (accessed May 29, 2017). 
47
 ETC Group, Breaking Bad: Big Ag Mega-Mergers in Play, (December 2015), Communique 115, available at 
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48
 Ibid., p. 8.  
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Hi-Breed 
Monsanto 10.0% 10.4% 11.7% 11.8% 11.3% 
Syngenta 11.4% 10.1% 10.3% 10.2% 9.7% 
Group 
Limagrain/Vilmori
n 
7.5% 7.9% 8.0% 7.4% 7.3% 
KWS 6.7% 7.0% 7.2% 7.0% 6.5% 
Bayer Crop Science 4.9% 4.8% 5.0% 4.5% 4.5% 
Dow 2.1% 3.5% 4.3% 4.4% 4.2% 
DLF Trifolium 2.6% 2.5% 2.5% 2.8% 2.7% 
Sakata (not among 
the top 10 in 
Europe) 
0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 
CR3
51
 European 
seed market 
35 35 38 38 35 
CR5 European seed 
market 
49 50 54 54 49 
CR9 European seed 
market 
59 62 66 65 61 
HHI 705 685 764 755 673 
 
However this picture varies for certain types of crop. For instance, it is reported that the 
European seed market for sugar beets shows the largest concentration with the first three 
companies (CR3) controlling a staggering 79% of the market (HHI: 2444), while for Maize seeds 
CR3 is 56% (HHI: 1425). High levels of concentration are also noted in the market for tomato 
seeds with Monsanto controlling 20% on registered seed varieties
52
. These figures of course do 
not take into account the recently approved mergers between Dow/Dupont and 
Syngenta/ChemChina, as we will explain in the following Section. 
A striking feature of these figures is the speed of this consolidation process, as most of 
this increase of the concentration level of the industry occurred the last twenty years, since the 
mid-1990s, the levels of concentration in the mid-1990s being close to those in 1985.  
 
Table 2: Evolution of the consolidation process in the global seed industry
53
. 
 
Year 1985 1996 2012 
                                                          
51
 CR3, CR5 and CR9 are indexes measuring concentration and refer to the level of the combined market shares of 
the largest 3, 5 and 9 companies in the relevant market. HHI is another concentration index which is calculated by 
summing the squares of the individual market shares of all the firms in the market. For example, in a market with 
five symmetric firms (each having a 20% market share) the HHI is 2,000; whereas in a market with six firms, but 
where one leading firm has half the market, a second has a market share of 20% and the remaining four have each 
5%, the HHI is 2,950. 
52
 European Commission, DG for Internal Policies, Overview of the Agricultural Inputs Sector in the EU (2015), 28. 
53
 See, Figure 6, European Commission, DG for Internal Policies, The EU Seed and Plant Reproductive Material 
Market in Perspective: A Focus on Companies and Market Shares - Note (2013), 20. 
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CR1
54
 4.1% 5% 21.8% 
CR2 5.7% 8% 37.3% 
CR3 6.8% 10.2% 44.4% 
CR4 7.9% 11.7% 48.2% 
CR5 8.9% 13% 48.2% 
CR6 9.9% 14.1% 54.6% 
CR7 10.9% 15.1% 57.5% 
CR8 11.7% 16% 59.7% 
CR9 12.5% 16.8% 60.7 
 
This has been particularly significant during the last decade for certain national markets 
in Europe. For instance, in France, the largest market in the EU, the 9 largest seed companies 
account for 69% of the total turnover of the sector
55
, gaining more than 10 percentage points 
since 2006
56
. Concentration levels in France for some field crops are also quite high, in particular 
for sugar beets (HHI: 3353), vegetable seeds (HHI: 2019) and oilseeds (HHI: 1908).  
Seed markets are highly fragmented by crop and by geographic area. Although there are 
almost 7,000 seed companies operating on the EU seed market
57
, there are considerable country 
and market niche variations. The concentration level of the EU’s largely conventional seed 
markets may be subject to a sudden increase. It suffices that a hybrid with a high yield is 
introduced in the market for farmers to prefer this instead of local varieties, the farmers being 
pushed, because of intensive competition, to choose the high-yielding seeds as these may provide 
higher rates of return on investment (of labour and capital). It follows that one should not take a 
static picture of the level of concentration of the market, but should aim to understand the 
competitive dynamics of capitalist agricultural production.   
This has led in the past to significant levels of concentration in certain markets. We 
include some examples only in view of the absence of other publicly available information. For 
instance, a single company controls 45 percent of the wheat market in the UK; while 5 
companies control 95% of the EU vegetable seed market. The maize seed sector, a vital part of 
the EU seed market is controlled by 5 companies whose collective market share amounts to 
51.4%: the maize varieties of DuPont Pioneer accounting for a 12.2% market share, Syngenta for 
11.5%, Limagrain for 9,7%, Monsanto for 8,95%, and KWS for 8,9%, from a total of 4975 
maize varieties registered in the European Common Catalogue
58
.   
 
                                                          
54
 CR1 denotes the market share of the largest in terms of turnover or sales undertaking in the relevant market, CR2 
the market share of the two largest in terms of turnover or sales in the relevant market and so on. 
55
 European Commission, DG for Internal Policies, Overview of the Agricultural Inputs Sector in the EU (2015), 14. 
56
 European Commission, DG for Internal Policies, The EU Seed and Plant Reproductive Material Market in 
Perspective: A Focus on Companies and Market Shares - Note (2013), 10. 
57
 Official controls: Impact on food business operators - seeds and plants, the European Seed Association’s 
presentation to the European Parliament, 14 October 2013, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/envi/dv/envi20131014_doc14_biloni_/envi2013101
4_doc14_biloni_en.pdf (accessed May 29, 2017). 
58
 I. Mammana, Concentration of Market Power in the EU Seed Market, (January 2014), Study commissioned by the 
Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament.  
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B. Pesticides 
 
Although there are between 630 and 655 companies present in this segment of the food value 
chain in Europe, the market may be characterized as concentrated, both at the world level and at 
the EU level. 
 
Table 3: Market shares and concentration ratios for top 7 crop protection agents’ 
companies operating in the EU-27 market
59
 
 
Company 2001 (% of 
market 
shares) 
2005 2008 2009 2010 
Syngenta 19.4 24.1 24.7 25.5 24.4 
Bayer 13.5 22.5 22.0 23.6 21.0 
BASF 22.3 26.5 15.6 16.4 15.9 
Dow - - 10.2 11.3 12.8 
Adama - - 6.63 6.48 6.91 
Du Pont 6.44 5.29 4.35 3.99 4.29 
Monsanto 3.63 2.94 3.02 3.97 2.70 
CR3 55.3 68.4 62.6 65.6 61.4 
CR5 - - 80.8 83.4 81.2 
CR7 65.4 92 90 91.4 88.2 
HHI - - 1646 1717 1566 
 
Most of the agro-chemical companies present in the pesticides market are also present in the seed 
sector, controlling a large part of the sales (around two-thirds)
60
. The same companies are also 
the incontestable leaders in R&D in agricultural research in seeds and chemicals
61
. The number 
of firms actively involved in R&D in this industry in Europe has decreased from 8 in 1995 to 4 
in 2012 (Bayer, Syngenta, BASF, and Isagro), with the number of new active ingredients in the 
development pipeline and new product launches going from 70 in 2000 to fewer than 30 in 
2012
62
. This may be explained by the fact that the cost of developing new varieties is quite 
high
63
, and that it is more profitable for firms to stick to existing products, proceeding to 
incremental innovations, rather than taking risks and developing new products that could 
cannibalize their older products. The sector has also been marked by a number of M&A 
transactions, in particular initiated by Bayer and BASF.  
                                                          
59
 European Commission, DG for Internal Policies, Overview of the Agricultural Inputs Sector in the EU (2015), 76. 
60
 BASF is present in seeds R&D, but does not sell seeds 
61
 K. Fuglie, P. Heisey, J. King, C.E. Pray, D. Schimmelpfennig, The Contribution of Private Industry to 
Agricultural Innovation, (2012) 338 Science 1031. 
62
 European Commission, DG for Internal Policies, Overview of the Agricultural Inputs Sector in the EU (2015), 77. 
63
 This is particularly costly for GM seeds, some estimating this to be US$136 million and thirteen years, seven 
years of which will be spent for regulatory approval: J. Deering, Senate analyses competition among a consolidating 
seed industry (2016), available at http://seedworld.com/senate-analyzes-competition-among-consolidating-seed-
industry/ (accessed May 29, 2017). 
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 An important characteristic of this market is the regulation of the various chemical 
products. As commercial and legal barriers to entry are considerable, one may expect a low 
likelihood of new entry in the industry, market structure being entrenched to a tight oligopoly. 
 
C. Which concentration level will be considered for merger purposes? 
 
Market structure and concentration is, of course, just one step in the assessment of 
mergers and is usually followed by a more thorough analysis of the possible anticompetitive 
effects and efficiencies, if the level of concentration resulting from the merger raises concerns. 
Although the EU market for seeds may not at the moment be characterized as highly 
concentrated, if one applies the conventional measures of HHI
64
, it is possible that following the 
mergers recently approved by the European Commission, the concentration level that is taken 
into account by the Commission in the affected markets will respectively increase.  
One may project that, as the Dow/Dupont and ChemChina/Syngenta mergers have been 
recently cleared, the first without conditions relating to the seeds’ market(s), and the second with 
only some conditions relative to the plant growth regulator products, it will be more difficult for 
the Bayer/Monsanto merger that will be last examined to be approved without conditions relating 
to the affected relevant markets. In its press release announcing its decision on the Dow/Dupont 
transaction, the Commission made clear that it “examined each case on its own merits”, 
according to the “so-called priority rule”, on a first come, first served basis and on the basis of 
“currently prevailing market situation”65. The “currently prevailing market situation” in which 
the Bayer/Monsanto merger will be assessed will be certainly more concentrated than that of the 
Dow/Dupont and ChemChina/Syngenta mergers. 
In assessing a merger, the Commission ultimately examined if it would give rise to a 
Significant Impediment of Effective Competition (SIEC). It bases its analysis on a counterfactual 
scenario comparing the post-merger scenario a hypothetical scenario absent the merger in 
question.
66
 The Commission also takes into account future changes to the market that can 
“reasonably be foreseen”.67 The identification of the proper counterfactual is complicated when 
there are more than one merger occurring in parallel in the same relevant market. Under the 
mandatory notification regime, the Commission does not factor into the counterfactual analysis 
the merger notified after the one under assessment.
68
 
 It is unclear from the Dow/Dupont press release if the Commission took into account, when 
considering the level of concentration and the competitive effects of the merger on the various 
markets affected, the market situation resulting at least from the notified merger between 
ChemChina and Syngenta, which has been notified to the Commission a few months after the 
notification of the Dow/Dupont merger.  
                                                          
64
 On HHI see footnote 51. 
65
 European Commission, Press Release, IP/17/772 (emphasis added). 
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 Id. 
68
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When approving the Dow/Dupont merger transaction
69
, the Commission did not include 
any specific remedy concerning the seed segment of the value chain, all remedies focusing on a 
number of markets for existing pesticides and certain petrochemical products. These were 
markets on which the two merged companies held high market shares and the merger would 
have reduced the number of competitors from four to three. The parties agreed to divest a 
significant part of DuPont's existing pesticide business, some manufacturing facilities for 
petrochemicals products and the grant of an exclusive license to DuPont's product for rice 
cultivation in the European Economic Area, thus enabling a buyer to replace the competitive 
constraint exerted by DuPont in these markets. These remedies have not dealt with the increasing 
concentration in seeds markets.  
Company confidentiality makes it difficult to ascertain market-specific market shares, but 
as the ChemChina/Syngenta merger went ahead without conditions in the seed segment, the 
Monsanto/Bayer merger will intervene at a market where competition has already been 
significantly weakened.  
 
D. Furthering existing consolidation in this sector 
 
The merger will involve two companies with a considerable patent and plant variety 
rights’ portfolio. Bayer is particularly strong in the plant genetic engineering arena in the EU, 
‘holding more patents on transgenic plant traits (206) than Monsanto (119)’70. Monsanto owns 
96% of cotton traits patented in the United States, being a de facto monopolist regarding the 
setting of prices and terms through cross-cutting licensing agreements
71
.  
The combination of these various IP portfolios may lead to entrenched market power, and 
thus stifle cumulative innovation on this sector. The merger will reinforce the existing 
contractual consolidation in this sector which has taken, so far, the form of cross-licensing and 
other joint ventures
72
. Mergers usually lead to a more permanent combination of assets that 
cannot be easily undone, in case the consummated merger leads to anticompetitive effects and 
reduces cumulative innovation. Existing forms of contractual consolidation include the 
following: 
 
- Cross-licensing and trait licensing agreements: Some recent research has documented a 
spider web of cross-licensing agreements of proprietary traits and technologies between 
the “Big Six”73. This form of collaboration is particularly linked to the development of 
crops stacking multiple transgenic traits, some of them combining transgenic traits owned 
by different companies, within a single seed. By licensing traits to one another, 
companies can sell their own technologies as well as the technologies of their 
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competitors. Monsanto’s traits are the central node in this network of agreements, as it is 
the only firm to have agreements with each of the other 5 firms, with the result that, 
according to some estimations, “more than 80% of the land planted with major field 
crops in the US contained transgenic traits owned or licensed by Monsanto”74.  
 
- Joint ventures: Joint ventures in the sector have already been analyzed by the European 
Commission.
75
.  
 
- Distribution agreements: In order to distribute their own products on the national and 
local markets, a large seed company can make a deal with smaller seed companies 
without owning them. This may dampen competition between them to the detriment of 
consumers. 
 
- Collaborations, research agreements and R&D strategic alliances: A number of inter-
firm alliances have also developed in recent years. BASF and Monsanto have 
collaborated since 2007 on R&D partnerships worth $2.5 billion in breeding, biotech, 
pesticides, ag microbials, ag biologicals, and precision agriculture
76
. Microbial products 
are a new opportunity and potentially a game changer and a disrupting technology at the 
global scale. Although currently the industry is still in its infancy (less than USD 2bn of 
global sales in 2014), going forward it represents a huge potential, especially given the 
growing demand for organic farming globally. Realizing this, in 2014 Monsanto 
announced an alliance known as BIOAG Alliance with Novozymes, one of leaders in 
biotech industry. Novozymes is responsible for the production of the microbial products 
while Monsanto serves as the lead for field testing, registration, and commercialization 
for the Alliance’s products77.  
 
- Patent litigation truces: Following a period of patent war about who controls the 
technology for making soybeans resistant to the weed-killer Roundup, known generically 
as glyphosate, DuPont and Monsanto agreed in 2013 to drop antitrust and patent claims 
against each other. Commenting on the agreement, Brett D. Begemann, Monsanto’s 
president and chief commercial officer, noted in a joint news release: “(t)his signals a 
new approach to our companies doing business together, allowing two of the leaders in 
the industry to focus on bringing farmers the best products possible”78. This culture of 
“doing business together” may increase risks of collusion or parallel exclusion of actual 
and/or potential competitors. 
 
                                                          
74
 Ph. Howard, Visualizing Consolidation in the Global Seed Industry:1996-2008, (2009) 1 Sustainability 1266, 
1279. 
75
 Case No COMP/M.6454 - LIMAGRAIN / KWS / GENECTIVE JV (2013). 
76
 ETC Group Communiqué 115, Breaking Bad (December 2015). 
77
 BIOAG Alliance Fact Sheet, available at http://www.novozymes.com/en/about-us/brochures/Documents/BioAg-
Alliance-factsheet.pdf (accessed May 29, 2017). 
78
 A, Pollack, Monsanto and DuPont Settle Fight Over Patent Licensing, New York Times (March 26, 2013). 
19 
 
- ‘Post-Patent’ Generic trait agreements: One may also mention as an illustration of the 
extensive collaboration between the Big Six the generic trait agreement aiming to put in 
place a “post-patent” regulatory regime, laying down the rules for access to generic 
biotech traits at patent expiration
79
. The expiration of some of the first biotech patents 
granted in the mid to late 1980s makes it theoretically possible that generics may enter 
these markets. The Big Six may attempt to delay such entry, using exclusionary 
strategies, such as failing to renew the regulatory approval of a biotech trait before 
expiration of the patent or that of existing regulatory approvals. In order to pre-empt any 
regulatory or competition law initiative in this area, the industry leaders put in place a 
“unique private sector solution to address the transition of regulatory and stewardship 
responsibilities for biotech”80. Their aim is to ultimately control the terms of access to 
expired traits. 
 
Take-away 
 
Consolidation has been on the rise in recent years, both globally and in Europe. If the merger is 
approved, three companies (ChemChina-Syngenta, Du Pont-Dow and Bayer-Monsanto) will 
own and sell up to 60 percent of world’s patented seeds and 64% of world’s 
pesticides/herbicides. Although the EU is a conventional seeds market and thus relatively less 
concentrated than the US market, the concentration level is high for certain products, such as 
vegetable seeds, and in certain geographic areas. The concentration level will of course increase 
following the approval of the Dow/Dupont and ChinaChem/Syngenta mergers, in particular as 
this was done without conditions relating to the seeds market. Consequently, the 
Bayer/Monsanto transaction will be assessed in a market where competition has already been 
weakened.  Increasing concentration is one side of the story, as the market is characterized by a 
significant number of contractual forms of consolidation, in the form of cross-licensing 
agreements, joint ventures, and other R&D strategic alliances. 
 
V. A significant impediment to effective competition and relevant markets affected  
 
The merger will produce effects on various markets, such as pesticides, including non-
selective herbicides (Glyphosate and Glufosinate), fungicides, seed treatment products and plant 
growth regulators, of course a variety of seeds for various crops, as well as the market for 
precision farming equipment and data-driven solutions in agriculture. Market leaders in this 
industry have made the choice of positioning themselves as fully integrated providers, the 
orchestrators of a network, or partners of an established network. By developing an “integrated 
offering of equipment and services for farmers,” enabling them to “gradually build a compelling 
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one-stop solution that will allow them to compete for the lion’s share of the market”81. By 
offering a package of ‘complementary’ products and technologies, they will be able to establish 
and control their own value chain, change the way competition takes place in this industry
82
.  
Firms have the choice to either opt for an open system in which different complementary 
assets (such as genetic traits and seed germplasm) interoperate well with rival technology, or to 
develop “closed” platforms. This choice involves “fundamental decisions to promote open 
source versus proprietary technologies, “plug-and-play” versus non-standardized components, 
and tactics that are designed to frustrate rivals’ access to needed technology”83.  
The emergence of integrated technology/traits/seeds/chemicals platforms may place barriers 
to new entry, as companies wishing to enter the market(s) would need to offer an integrated 
solution to farmers. This may stifle disruptive innovation, if in the absence of the merger, firms 
were able to enter one or two segments of the market (e.g. research and breeding) without the 
need to offer an “integrated” platform product that would offer significant economies of scale, 
but would also require high fixed costs. This may eventually protect the existing market position 
of these market leaders from the risk of disruptive entry at another segment of the value chain
84
.  
 
A. Effects on product markets: price, output and consumer choice 
 
The merger will affect competition in the markets for crop seeds, by increasing, in 
particular the levels of market concentration in the control of seed traits technology and 
germplasm. Although this will certainly be a major concern in GM seeds’ dominated markets, 
such as the US, where more than 90% of corn, cotton and soybean acreage is planted with 
transgenic varieties, it could also be a concern in more traditional seed markets, which are 
expected to be the fastest growing segment of the total seed sales. The new entity will control 
70% of the cottonseed market in the US
85
. As most of the stacks of transgenic traits constitute 
combinations of traits from different companies (inter-firm stacking), in which Monsanto 
constitutes, thanks to its cross-licensing agreements, the central node (at least for traited cotton, 
soybean and corn seeds), the merger may further dampen competition, reinforcing Bayer’s and 
Monsanto’s market position in genetic traits and related herbicides86. 
Although Bayer and Monsanto are primarily active in different segments of the food 
value chain, the two companies also compete in specific seed markets. For instance, Monsanto’s 
Deltapine brand competes with Bayer’s Fibermax and Stoneville brands for cotton seed. 
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Following the merger, Bayer will have access to more than 2000 varieties of seeds for crops
87
. It 
will also gain a leadership role in the big data in agriculture, enabling it to integrate its expertise 
with precision planting
88
. The merger will lead to the geographic expansion of the 
Bayer/Monsanto integrated platform, Monsanto disposing of a dominant share of the markets for 
seeds in the United States and Latin America, while Bayer being strong in Europe and the Asia-
Pacific region
89
. 
It is also clear that the merger will affect competition in the pesticides markets, in view of 
the competitive relation between Bayer’s Liberty and Monsanto’s Roundup (glyphosate). Suffice 
to note that the market for pesticides was covered by the commitments the Commission accepted 
in the Dow/Dupont merger. 
One of the major concerns in this sector is that further industry concentration will 
increase the risk of collusive pricing. Coordination between few market players (around 3) is 
easier. This is particularly the case in the context of markets with significant barriers to entry 
resulting from the important sunk costs for R&D and the need to offer an ‘integrated’ one stop 
solution to farmers requiring entry in various market segments. Almost the same institutional 
investors simultaneously hold large blocks of shares in both firms, as well as some of their 
competitors, which may also be a factor facilitating collusion
90
. In particular, 
 BlackRock Inc. controls 5.97% of Monsanto, 6.31% of Dupont and 6.58% of 
Dow Chemical;  
 the Vanguard Group controls 6.82% of Monsanto, 6.99% of Dupont and 6.65% of 
Dow Chemicals 
 State Street Corp. controls 4.59% of Monsanto, 4.91% of Dupont and 3.97% of 
Dow Chemicals
91
. 
The new more consolidated market structure presents increasing risks for the adoption of 
strategies of ‘parallel exclusion’92 or cumulative foreclosure effect93, as the remaining platforms, 
which are linked through a wide network of cross-licensing and other cooperation agreements, in 
addition to the common ownership highlighted above
94
, may attempt to raise the costs of 
potential rivals, including biotechnology start-ups researching the plant-microbiome for 
biological agriculture products and products based on genome editing technologies.  
Market leaders may also opt for a strategy of integrating these disruptive start-ups within 
their global value chains once the latter’s R&D investments may begin to mature into innovative 
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products
95
. Companies would thus spend their money in defensive ways by buying potential 
competition leading to a considerable acceleration of M&A activity, which because of the high 
turnover thresholds for merger control may not satisfy the jurisdictional criteria for merger 
control, and would thus escape from the scrutiny of competition authorities. The merger may 
also facilitate their access to cheap capital and debt-based external growth, facilitating these 
practices of buying potential competition.  
Depending on the market power of the merged entity in various product markets, the 
merger may lead to unilateral effects if the two merging parties are the closest competitors in the 
specific relevant market (e.g. Bayer’s Liberty competing with Monsanto’s Roundup). 
It is likely that IP rights will be strategically employed in order to block new entry, in 
particular from generics. This will likely occur if the merged entity controls indispensable 
technologies, germplasm or data packages. Monsanto’s Roundup and Roundup Ready 
technology has entered the public domain, when the patent on the trait for soybeans expired in 
2015. Competitors were thus able for the first time to introduce a generic version of the trait. 
However, Monsanto has patented the Genuity™ Roundup Ready 2 Yield trait technology, these 
seeds being protected by a different utility patent which will not expire until the end of the next 
decade. Even if patents expire on transgenic traits there are still patents protecting breeding 
technologies, germplasm and conventional (“native”) traits96.  
The speed of the entry of generics in this market will depend on the access generic seed 
companies may have to Monsanto’s and other Big Six’ data packages allowing them an 
advanced development and testing. Similar concerns arise also in the crop protection agents 
segment, where the registration of a crop protection product may take a significant amount of 
time and money, (between 8-10 years and around $260 million before commercial launch)
97
. 
Of course, following a well-established case law of the CJEU, such restrictions may 
come under the scope of ex post control under Article 102 TFEU. Thus, a mere possibility that 
such conduct could be adopted by the parties should not lead to the prohibition of the merger, as 
it cannot be assumed that the parties will infringe Article 102 TFEU. The Commission has 
nevertheless the competence to examine comprehensively whether it is probable that the merged 
entity may impose a significant impediment of effective competition, taking into account the 
Merger Regulation’s purpose of prevention98. Since the adoption of the new SIEC test under 
Regulation 139/2004, a merger may also be prohibited even if it does not lead to an abuse of a 
dominant position that could eventually be caught, or deterred, by the ex post enforcement of 
Article 102 TFEU. 
Most of the merger activity in this sector has occurred outside the radar of competition 
authorities, and in particular the Commission. There has only been one seeds merger case since 
2006, Syngenta’s acquisition of Monsanto’s sunflower seed business, which has been subject to 
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remedial conditions. The Commission expressed concerns over the possible exclusionary effects 
of the merger, which would have removed a considerable competitor in the market for the 
commercialisation of sunflower seeds in Spain and Hungary. It also expressed concerns with 
regard to the exchange and licensing of sunflower varieties, insofar as the merging parties would 
have been in a position to restrict the access of competitors to inputs necessary for the 
commercialisation of sunflower seeds. The foreclosure of competitors in the markets for the 
commercialization of sunflower seeds would have led to the reduction of innovation, and the 
subsequent reduction of consumer choice in sunflower seed hybrids. To address these concerns 
Monsanto agreed to divest its sunflower hybrids
99
. The focus of the Commission on the 
foreclosure of competitors and the reduction of innovation and consumer choice are likely to 
influence the approach it will follow in the Bayer/Monsanto merger. 
The effect of the merger on prices may lead to considerable effects for the viability of 
smallholder farming. The share of seeds in total farm cost ranges between 2% and 15% among 
EU Member States
100
. EU farmers have faced increases in prices of seeds and planting stock by 
30% between 2000 and 2010
101
. 
Higher levels of consolidation may also lead to a decrease in the number of available 
cultivars, with a shift in focus to crops and hybrids more profitable to companies, and the 
termination of breeding programs for regionally relevant crops
102
, thus restricting consumer 
(farmer) choice. It has also been noted that consumer choice might become illusory if the same 
few companies own the largest number of the most popular brands. For instance, Monsanto owns 
Seminis and De Ruiter in the vegetable seeds market, and Dekalb and Asgrow in the agricultural 
seeds market
103
. 
Following the announcement of the merger, Bayer and Monsanto have been considering 
the sale of some of their assets that could be considered as raising the risk of competition law 
concerns in order to push for regulatory clearance of their merger. It is expected that these assets 
to be divested will relate to soybean, cotton and canola seeds, where the two companies have 
significant overlaps, as well as Bayer’s LibertyLink-branded crops, in view of the fact that this is 
an alternative to Monsanto’s Roundup ready seeds. However, it is unclear if such pre-emptive 
structural (divestiture) remedies, as well as remedies that may eventually be imposed by the 
European Commission and other competition authorities, would be effective to deal with these 
horizontal overlaps and eventual portfolio effects. The divested assets need to be acquired by 
third parties without that acquisition raising competition concerns, something that may be 
difficult in the context of the Bayer-Monsanto merger as it would be difficult to find a viable 
competitor outside the three market leaders
104
. More importantly, such divestitures of chemical 
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products, that may become obsolete in view of the recent progress of genome editing 
technologies, will not address the negative effects of the merger on future competition in these 
markets and innovation. Indeed, the three mega agro-chem corporations that would dominate the 
market if Bayer/Monsanto merger goes through, would control large patent portfolios, would 
employ specialised personnel, dispose of well-known brands and would have an installed (and 
dependent) customer base (farmers) for various products (through long-term contract 
agriculture). They would thus maintain their ability to conquer back market shares and expand in 
any segment of the agricultural value chain. 
 
B. Effects on innovation  
 
The Big Six usually develop an integrated strategy for R&D for all types of crops, working on 
“traditional” market-assisted breeding, or the more recent forms of predictive breeding that have 
become commercially possible with the reduction of the cost of genome sequencing and the use 
of IT, as well as on genetically engineered seeds. It is clear that the effects of this merger on 
innovation will not only be limited in the genetically engineered traited seeds, but will inevitably 
expand to conventional seeds. As it is explained by a recent report commissioned by the 
American Antitrust Institute, the Food&Water Watch and the National Farmers Union, following 
the acquisition by the largest agricultural biotechnology companies of independent conventional 
and hybrid seed breeders in the last two large merger waves in this sector, the agro-chem 
companies cut back their non-biotech offerings, or even altogether dropped them, limiting choice 
for farmers
105
. One may not exclude the significant interlinkages between R&D in both bio-tech 
and conventional plant breeding and the need to ensure that there would be sufficient incentives 
to innovate in conventional plant breeding, which is still the dominant method of breeding in the 
EU. 
Assessing the possible effects of each merger on innovation will be a quite complex exercise, 
in view of the various perspectives one may take on innovation and its interaction with market 
structure. Innovation could refer to investment in new technologies, but also on the broader 
direction of the R&D effort in the industry in the future. Investment in seed saving and seed 
diversity, rather than standardisation of traits, or in non-agro-chemical pest management 
approaches constitutes a business model that farmers may be less likely to choose, if they are 
forced to take their advice from the same agro-chem giants. Indeed, one may not exclude the 
possibility that the latter will have a material bias to promote the type of productive model for 
farmers, as this would enable them to increase the farmer’s technological dependence on them 
and acquire a larger share of the total surplus value produced by the agricultural value chain, in 
comparison to the conventional breeding model. 
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The effect on innovation will certainly be a crucial aspect of the European Commission’s 
merger assessment. The innovation potential of the merging firms, in particular if “one or more 
merging parties are important innovators in ways not reflected in market shares”, is taken into 
account, irrespective of the levels of concentration that are usually considered by the 
Commission’s Horizontal Guidelines as raising competition concerns106. Similarly, the EU non-
horizontal merger guidelines list the diminishing of innovation as a competition concern for 
vertical and conglomerate mergers
107
 and also state that mergers involving innovative companies 
that are likely to expand significantly in the near future will be extensively investigated even 
when the post-merger market share is below 30%
108
. In a recent Competition Policy Brief, the 
European Commission explains that harm to innovation may justify the Commission to consider 
that a merger between a firm present in the relevant market with a firm that is not actually 
present in the relevant market could lead to a significant impediment of effective competition
109
. 
Hence, negative effects in innovation may not only be produced by mergers leading to important 
horizontal overlaps, but also by vertical or conglomerate mergers. 
In its recent decision on the Dow/Dupont merger, the European Commission found that the 
merger may have reduced innovation competition for pesticides by looking to the ability and the 
incentive of the parties to innovate. The Commission found that the fact that two parties were 
competing head-to-head in a number of important herbicide, insecticide and fungicide innovation 
areas may have affected, after the merger, the incentive of the new entity to innovate and may 
have led it to discontinue some of these costly development efforts. The Commission emphasised 
that this analysis was not general but was based on “specific evidence that the merged entity 
would have lower incentives and a lower ability to innovate than Dow and DuPont separately” 
and “that the merged entity would have cut back on the amount they spent on developing 
innovative products”110.  
 
European Commission, Press Release on Dow/Dupont, (2017) 
 
“(o)nly five companies (BASF, Bayer, Syngenta and the merging parties) are globally active 
throughout the entire R&D process, from discovery of new active ingredients (molecules 
producing the desired biological effect), their development, testing and regulatory registration, to 
the manufacture and sale of final formulated products through national distribution channels. 
Other competitors have no or more limited R&D capabilities (e.g. as regards geographic focus or 
product range). After the merger, only three global integrated players would remain to compete 
with the merged company, in an industry with very high barriers to entry. The number of players 
active in specific innovation areas would be even lower than at the overall industry level”111. 
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This type of assessment looks close to the filter of the existence of at least four independent 
technologies that constitute a commercially viable alternative, in addition to the licensed 
technology controlled by the parties to the agreement that the Commission usually employs in its 
Transfer of Technology Guidelines
112
. This is used in order exclude the possibility that a 
licensing agreement may restrict competition and thus infringe Article 101 TFEU. There is no 
reason why the Commission should apply a different approach in the context of merger control. 
The above indicates that the Commission may view more negatively mergers that lead to less 
than three or four independent technologies commercially available on the market, which is 
exactly what the Monsanto/Bayer merger will have as effect on the seed markets. 
It has been alleged that by looking to the broader effects on the direction of innovation in the 
industry the Commission may establish a novel theory of harm, that of a significant impediment 
to industry innovation (SIII), in particular if it does not assess this effect on specific innovation 
markets that could be affected by the merger
113. According to this view, the Commission’s SIII 
theory is based on a presumption that regulatory intervention is warranted when a merger 
removes a “parallel path R&D”, this being not in line with the standard of proof in EU merger 
control, which would require, according to these critics, to define a specific innovation market 
that would be affected by the merger
114
. 
These criticisms are far-fetched. First, it is quite difficult to explain why the competition 
authority should not assess, when examining the merger, what would be its effects on the 
innovation incentives in the industry. This has already been done, without necessarily defining a 
specific “innovation market”. Second, the Commission’s approach, as it has also been expressed 
in the context of the Transfer of Technology Guidelines, indicates that the main concern is the 
existence of sufficient choice in terms of independent technologies available in the market. Such 
analysis need not be hypothetical and it can be based on plausible effects. It is possible to take 
into account the patent portfolio strength of the merging parties, as well as the existence of 
licensing and cross-licensing agreements with rivals and internal strategy documents in order to 
assess the possible effects of a specific merger on innovation. Defining “innovation markets” is 
just one of the various methodologies at the disposal of the Commission to assess the effects of a 
merger transaction on innovation. Such an approach may not work well in mergers involving 
various segments of the value chain, and involving the development of integrated farming 
solutions that could be used by the farmers. There is a high risk that the use of “innovation 
markets” in this competitive context could omit some possible innovation effects. 
The market for agricultural biotechnology development is particularly concentrated, with the 
Big Six accounting for a significant number of agricultural bio-technology patents issued in the 
US, as well as more than 80% of crop field trials for regulatory release in the US
115
. There is 
empirical evidence of the inverse relationship between firm concentration in corn, cotton and 
soybean seed markets, and R&D intensity in these markets, research finding that as the number 
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of firms declined following the M&A waves, the intensity of R&D fell
116
. Similar evidence 
exists for the effect of mergers on innovation in the pharmaceutical industry
117
. Although 
synergies and efficiencies have often been put forward as the main rationale for mergers, the 
empirical evidence that these are effectively realized remains rather poor
118
. The companies may 
argue that they will increase spending on R&D. However, there may be doubts on these 
increases in R&D research materializing, in view of the fact that their R&D expenses have been 
going down recently
119
. Having three instead of six important market players may restrict the 
possibilities of joint collaboration on R&D, in view of the prevalence of cross-licensing in this 
sector, thus increasing the risk of tacit collusion, in particular as most stacks are inter-firm stacks. 
Overlaps in biotech innovation could also lead to size down research capabilities and thus restrict 
the number of R&D poles. Finally, a recent drop in research intensity in this sector may be 
related to the increasing consolidation of the industry, thus showing an inverse relation between 
market concentration and innovation. 
  
J. Fernandez-Cornejo & D. Schimmelpfennig, Have Seed Industry Changes Affected 
Research Effort?, Amber Waves (2004), available at https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-
waves/2004/february/have-seed-industry-changes-affected-research-effort/  
  
‘Calculations for corn, soybeans, and cotton indicate that as the seed industry became more 
concentrated during the late 1990s, private research intensity dropped or slowed. Was there a 
connection between the concentrating industry and the slowing intensity? Further ERS analysis, 
using econometric methods, found a simultaneous self-reinforcing relationship. Those companies 
that survived seed industry consolidation appear to be sponsoring less research relative to the 
size of their individual markets than when more companies were involved. This finding runs 
counter to the hypothesis that dominant firms in consolidated industries conduct more new 
product research than they otherwise would in order to expand the size of their markets (because 
of less risk of being outcompeted during the long time periods required to bring new products to 
market)’. 
 
Take away 
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The merger risks producing a significant impediment to effective competition. First, it may lead 
to price increases and output restrictions. This may be due to the ability and incentive of the 
merged entity to develop exclusionary strategies, in particular against disruptive small 
innovators. High overall consolidation and the presence of three integrated platforms may also 
dampen competition. The high risks of collusion in a three competitors market where firms have 
significant links, either in the form of cross-licensing agreements and shared genetic trait 
varieties, or in the form of interlocking shareholding by more or less the same institutional 
investors, may also facilitate collusion between the existing players in this tight oligopoly. 
Finally, the merger will produce significant effects on innovation, as the two companies will 
reduce their R&D expenses and merge competing R&D programmes, further reducing research 
intensity in this sector. 
 
VI. Farmers and global food value chains 
 
The consumers that would be primarily affected by the merger are farmers, who already 
dispose of a limited bargaining power. Traditionally, competition law has dealt with such 
unbalances of power by reinforcing the bargaining power of farmers so as to counter-balance that 
of other segments of the food value chain, downstream but also upstream, by enabling them to 
form agricultural cooperatives. These specific exceptions/regimes have nevertheless been under 
attack lately and their scope limited, as a result of the rise of a specific view of the consumer 
welfare paradigm in competition law. It is also another issue to deal with a dozen seed and agro-
chem players compared with just three integrated platforms across all segments of the value 
chain. The exclusion and marginalization of competitors through anticompetitive practices of 
input or customer foreclosure
120
, may lead to increasing exploitation of farmers. The rise of 
“contract agriculture”121 has led farmers to enter into “take it or leave it” long-term exchanges 
with only a few companies controlling germplasm. This may reinforce their technological 
dependence vis-à-vis a small number of agro-chem companies, rendering switching to another 
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(new) product or package of products particularly difficult, even if new entrants may offer more 
personalized service and products developed for local soils and climates.  
The consolidation of the agricultural manufacturing industry that may be expected from 
these strategies to develop one-stop shop solutions for farmers will further reduce the bargaining 
power of farmers. Farming as an industry will become increasingly commoditisized, meaning 
that farmers will find themselves outsourcing more and more critical inputs (i.e., seeds) and 
decisions (through IT decision-support systems) to global agriculture solutions providers. The 
farmers will thereby increasingly lose control of seed materials (this decision in turn defines the 
mix of crop protection products and other inputs), and very soon they may be forced to outsource 
other decision-making capabilities. This will have devastating effects on local varieties and non-
standardised agricultural products. In the long run, to stay competitive farmers will be forced to 
use standardised seeds supplied to them from a limited number of global players, and an 
associated array of complementary products to these seeds from the same companies. Also, they 
will be using relatively the same agriculture machinery from the other limited group of global 
equipment providers such as John Deere, CNH, AGCO, Claas, etc, or eventually be locked in 
data-driven agricultural equipment platforms managed by Bayer/Monsanto. In view of the 
commitment of the EU to support farmers and enhance their bargaining power, these concerns 
should be taken into account when assessing the merger. 
 
Take away 
 
Farmers will pay the price of an increase in concentration in this sector. Not only will they be 
technologically, and eventually economically dependent, on an integrated seed/agro-chem/smart 
agriculture platform, but their work risks becoming increasingly commoditised. Consequently, 
they will lose control over decisions concerning the use of inputs, such as seeds and pesticides, 
as well as outsourcing other decision-making capabilities. This may have important implications 
on variety and choice in these markets. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
If it is approved, the proposed Bayer-Monsanto merger will create a tight oligopolistic 
market of three global agri-tech platforms that will control almost 2/3 of the global production of 
seeds and agrochemicals, and an important position in the agricultural equipment markets related 
to Big Data and “smart agriculture”. These three integrated platforms will become a one-stop 
shop for farmers, who will be technically and economically dependent on them, for all important 
decisions, thus ceasing effectively to operate as independent economic actors.  
The merger will not only have effects on the prices of inputs, as well as the amount of 
inputs (e.g. pesticides) used by the farmers, with possibly negative environmental implications, 
but will also influence the direction of the innovative effort in the industry, as most R&D 
investments will focus on the agro-chem model of agricultural production, consistently with the 
dominant business model of these companies, and not on seed saving and seed diversity, as well 
as non-agro-chem pest management technologies.  
30 
 
Innovation in the industry will also be reduced, with only three (or four in the best-case 
scenario) independent private R&D poles (that is, independent centres of R&D) actively present 
in the world. This is particularly damaging as public funding in agricultural R&D has either 
faller or stayed stagnant in recent decades, the main research effort being accomplished in the 
private sector
122
, and as new technologies, including CRISPR, are applied in the sector. In order 
to promote innovation, we need multiple competing R&D poles rather than a concentrated R&D 
structure. 
It may be argued that humanity is doomed to face famine and malnutrition, unless 
considerable amounts of investment are made in R&D. In view of the fall of public investments 
and increasingly more important role of private investments in this sector the argument has been 
put forward that a higher level of consolidation could lead to higher profitability (at the expense 
of farmers) without necessarily leading to immediate effects on food prices. Indeed, the farmer 
segment is driven by atomistic competition in most markets, and therefore does not have the 
ability to pass on, at least immediately, the eventual overcharges to the final consumers. Such an 
approach may not factor in the effects to the livelihood of around half a billion farmers in the 
world and their families, most of whom do not benefit from subsidies guaranteeing an acceptable 
standard of living. It also assumes that higher profitability would lead to higher investments in 
R&D, a claim that has been recently questioned by research indicating that large firms prefer to 
retain earnings and distribute them to shareholders and the management rather than invest them 
in R&D
123. But, more generally, a simple question that one may ask is “is this projected merger 
necessary in order to promote innovation in this sector”? 
Our answer is negative. The main reason efficiency gains were put forward by these 
mergers relates to synergies (estimated to US $1,5 billion by 2020
124
) and cost cutting made 
possible because of the integration of Monsanto’s and Bayer’s research expertise in seeds and 
pesticides. One may, first, question the benefits to dynamic efficiency and innovation of cost 
cutting in traits research, which constitutes one of the three major categories of cost synergies 
expected by the merger
125
. Cutting R&D and the pursuit of diverse research programmes and 
routes does not constitute an “efficiency gain” public authorities should easily accept. Second, 
should we accept such efficiency gains, this will orient the research effort towards agro-chem 
models of agricultural production. However, these admittedly lead to a decrease in agricultural 
biodiversity. A “combined R&D pipeline” may also reduce the need to explore different 
innovation avenues that would have been possible if multiple innovation channels competed in 
the industry.  
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The main rationale for the transaction is the constitution of integrated platforms raising 
the opportunities to gain a larger percentage of the global food value chain to the detriment of 
farmers. It also provides these integrated platforms the power to manage the process of 
innovation in the sector, by giving them the ability to impede the entry of smaller disruptive 
innovators and/or marginalize them, in case they are not able to integrate them, possibly by 
buying them out, in their value chains. This “long term value creation potential” of the merger, is 
merely associated to future profits that will be generated by their packaged sales of seeds, traits, 
pesticides and IT, and is merely financed through debt with US $ 57 billion committed by Bank 
of America, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, HSBC and JP Morgan
126
.  
The affected markets are highly concentrated. The negative effects of this merger on 
innovation are more than plausible. The difficulty to find independent purchasers of the divested 
assets may also limit the attraction of a conditional approval solution. The existence of less 
competition-restrictive alternatives to achieve the synergies put forward by the parties is also 
clear, if one looks to the different forms of contractual collaboration occurring in the industry. 
All these factors together argue for the Commission to take action and to block the merger. 
Should this not happen, it becomes crucial to devise a remedial package that will address, if not 
all, most of the competition concerns. This calls for the divestiture of assets, in particular linked 
to the R&D capabilities of the companies, as well as their IT business, that would avoid reducing 
the technological dependence of farmers. It is clear that these divestitures should engage with all 
the possible theories of harm, something that no competition authority examining this merger has 
done so far. For instance, the recent global divestiture remedy for the Liberty Link traits business 
and Bayer’s Liberty business, imposed by the South African Competition Commission as a 
condition for the clearance of the merger
127
, does not specifically deal with the exclusionary 
portfolio effects and the possible effects on innovation that may result from the combination of 
germplasm, traits, breeding technologies, crop protection, Big Data and digital farming, neither 
takes into account the strength of the merging entity on traits and smart agriculture. In view of 
the significant effects of this merger on the EU market(s) and the presence of significant assets 
(in particular in R&D) in Europe, the European Commission is ideally placed to conduct this 
detailed analysis of the various theories of harm and to block the merger, in case, as we argue in 
this study, no other remedial option is appropriate. This will enable the development of a variety 
of R&D channels, further promoting innovation in this industry, to the greater benefit of the final 
consumers and the general public. 
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Annex 1- Bayer’s recent M&A Activity  
 
Year Company 
purchased/target 
Main Geographical 
markets involved 
 
Product/Main activity of 
target company 
 
2015 SeedWorks India Pvt. Ltd India  Breeding, production and 
marketing of hybrid seeds of 
tomato, hot pepper, okra and 
gourds 
2015 proPlant Gesellschaft für 
Agrar- und Umweltinformatik 
mbH 
Germany Agricultural digitalization: 
provider of plant health 
diagnosis and infection level 
warning service 
2014 Biagro Group Argentina, Brazil Production and distribution of 
biological seed treatment 
solutions 
2014 Granar S.A. Paraguay 
 
Breeding, production and 
marketing of improved seed 
(especially soybean seed) 
adapted to the growing 
conditions in subtropical 
regions 
2014 E. I. DuPont de Nemours and 
Company  
(acquisition of land 
management assets) 
United States. 
Canada, Mexico, 
Australia, New 
Zealand 
Forestry and range & pasture 
business segments 
2013 PROPHYTA Biologischer 
Pflanzenschutz GmbH 
Germany Supply of biological crop 
protection products 
2013 Wehrtec Tecnologia Agricola 
Ltda 
 
Brazil Production of soybean seed  
2013 Agricola Wehrmann Ltda  Brazil  Soybean business 
2013 Melhoramento Agropastoril 
Ltda 
Brazil Soy Germplasm Bank 
2013 FN Semillas S.A.  Argentina  Breeding, production and 
marketing of improved soybean 
seeds  
2012 Abbott & Cobb Inc. United States, 
Mexico, Australia 
Watermelon and melon seed 
business 
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and Asia 
2012 AgraQuest, Inc. United States, Global  Supply of innovative biological 
pest management solutions 
based on natural 
microorganisms  
2011 Hornbeck Seed Company, Inc. United States  Supply of  soybean, rice, and 
wheat varieties; in-house 
soybean 
breeding program and a 
proprietary 
soybean germplasm. 
2011 Raps GbR 
 
Germany Oilseed rape seed business and 
breeding material 
2009 Athenix Corporation United States Herbicide tolerance and insect 
control trait development 
platform, particularly for corn 
and soybeans 
2007 Stoneville Pedigreed Seed 
Company 
United States Cotton seed production 
2006 California Planting Cotton 
Seed Distributors, Inc. 
United States Development, production, and 
distribution of cotton planting 
seeds 
2006 Reliance Genetics LLC United States Cotton production 
2005 Associated Farmers Delinting, 
Inc. (acquisition of intangible 
assets and the property, plant 
and equipment required for the 
production of cotton seeds) 
United States Cotton seed production  
 
2004 Gustafson United States, 
Canada and Mexico 
Manufacture and marketing of 
seed treatment products and 
related technical equipment. 
2004 Bilag Industries Private Ltd, 
India (shares buy-back in a 
joint venture) 
India Manufacture of agrochemicals  
2002 Aventis CropScience Holding 
S.A. 
Global Crop protection, biotechnology 
and agrochemical specialties 
2001 Syngenta AG  
(acquisition of corn herbicide  
MIKADO
®)
 
Europe  Crop protection and herbicide 
2000 Novartis  
(acquisition of FLINT
®
 line 
Global Crop protection 
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of crop fungicides) 
2000 Misung Ltd.  
(acquisition of remaining 
interest of Joint Venture) 
South Korea Development and marketing of 
a wide range of crop protection 
products 
1999 pbi Home & Garden Limited United Kingdom Supply of plant protection 
products and fertilizers for 
amateur gardeners 
1998 Zeneca  
(acquisition of seed treatment 
business) 
United Kingdom Crop protection  
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Annex 2 – Monsanto’s recent M&A Activity 
 
 Year  Company 
purchased/target 
Main 
Geographical 
markets 
involved 
 
Product/Main activity of target company 
 
2016  Vitalfields 
 
Europe Digital agriculture innovation and farm 
management software 
2016 TargetGene 
(acquisition of 
undisclosed equity 
stake) 
Israel  Genome-editing technologies 
2014  BioAgAllicance United States Alliance with Novozyme to work on microbial 
solutions 
2013 Agradis, Inc. United States  Development of sustainable agricultural 
solutions. Includes a collection of microbes 
that can improve crop productivity 
2013 Rosetta Green Ltd  
 
Israel Identification and use of unique genes to 
guide key processes in major crops including 
corn, soybeans and cotton 
2013 Grass Roots 
Biotechnology  
 
United States Gene expression and other agriculture 
technologies 
2013 Dieckmann GmbH 
& CO. KG  
Germany Breeding of oilseed rape and rye seeds 
2013 The Climate 
Corporation  
United States Weather data analysis 
2012 Precision Planting, 
Inc.  
United States Planting technology development 
2012 Beeologics  
 
Israel Development of biological tools to provide 
targeted control of pests and diseases 
2011 Divergence, Inc. United States Research and development services for 
genomics and informatics on agriculture and 
infectious diseases, as well as products for the 
control of parasites 
2011 Pannon Seeds  Hungary Seed processing plant 
2010 Anasac  
 
Chile Corn and soybean processing plant  
2009 Westbred United States  Focus on wheat germplasm 
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2009 MDM (acquisition 
of equity stake) 
Brazil Cotton seed business 
2008 Aly Participacoes 
Ltda 
Brazil  Sugarcane breeding and research and 
development in plant applied genomics 
2008 Marmot, S.A. Guatemala, 
Central America, 
and South 
America 
Hybrid corn seed production and provider of 
corn, sorghum, forage sorghum, soybeans, and 
pastures (grass-type seeds) 
2008 De Ruiter Seeds 
Group B.V. 
Europe, Global  Breeding and production of hybrid vegetable 
seeds (including crops such as tomatoes, 
cucumbers, melons, peppers and rootstock). 
Provider of products to growers within the 
protected-culture vegetable seed market. 
2008 Evogene Ltd 
(acquisition of 
equity stake) 
Israel Focus on crop productivity 
2007 Agroeste Sementes Brazil Hybrid corn seed production 
2007 Delta and Pine 
Land Company 
United States  Commercial breeding, production and 
marketing of cotton planting seed. Also 
breeding, production and marketing of 
soybean planting seed. 
2005 Emergent Genetics, 
Inc. 
United States, 
India  
Cotton seed business 
2005 Icoria (agricultural 
division) 
United States  Biotechnologies  
2005 Seminis, Inc. United States, 
Global  
Development, growth and marketing of fruit 
and vegetable seeds 
2004 Channel Bio 
Corporation 
United States  Production and marketing of seeds 
(specialising in corn) 
1998 Plant Breeding 
International 
Cambridge Ltd. 
and PBI Saatzucht 
GmbH 
Europe Production and marketing of new and 
improved crop varieties. Includes significant 
breeding programs for winter wheat, barley, 
oil seed rape, beans, peas and potato 
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Annex 3: Seed and traits value chain
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Annex 4: Schematic representation of the agrochemicals supply chain
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